To: Federal PKI Policy Authority (FPKIPA)  
From: PKI Certificate Policy Working Group (CPWG)  
Subject: Updates to account for certificate Modification and Restoration  
Date: September 26, 2023

Title: Certificate Modifications and Restorations

X.509 Certificate Policy For The Federal Bridge Certification Authority Version 3.2 July 2023

Change Advocate’s Contact Information: fpki@gsa.gov

Organization requesting change: CPWG

Change summary: Clarify the requirements around certificate modifications, define requirements for certificate restoration, align audit and archive terminology for certificate status changes, and clarify the relationship between the CMS and the PIV-I content signer.

Background: Recent review of policy showed some confusion around the different requirements between a rekey and certificate modification. Additionally, the current policy requires entities document their suspension requirements; specifically, who can request suspensions and the minimum requirements for the suspension process. However, it is silent on policy requirements for restoring certificates (e.g., removal from suspension). This change seeks to provide parity with the suspension requirements to include who can request restoration, how they must be authenticated to support that request, and what actions need to take place upon restoration.

Finally, Section 6.1.1.4 and Section 6.2.1 have some divergent terminology as it relates to PIV-I content signing keys and their relationship to the CMS. This change works to align that terminology.

Specific Changes:

Insertions are underlined, deletions are in strikethrough:

FBCA Certificate Policy Change Proposal Number: 2023-05
4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification

CA certificates and Delegated OCSP responder certificates whose characteristics have changed (e.g., assert new policy OID) may be modified. The new certificate may have the same or a different subject public key.

A certificate associated with a Subscriber whose characteristics have changed (e.g., name change due to marriage) may be modified. The new certificate must have a different subject public key.

4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests

A modified certificate may use the same or a different subject public key as the original certificate, depending on issuance constraints. However, if the same key is used, certificate operational periods and key lifetimes as defined in Section 6.3.2 continue to apply.

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4.9.13. Circumstances for Suspension and Restoration

Suspension is not supported by the FBCA.

Entity CAs may support certificate suspension and restoration for Subscriber certificates. If suspension and restoration are supported by the CA, the CPS must describe under what circumstances and provide details as specified in sections 4.9.14, 4.9.15, and 4.9.16, for the corresponding sections below.

Practice Note: Certificate suspension should only be used in circumstances where there is a reasonable possibility that the certificate will need to be restored. Additionally, a certificate must be permanently revoked if it meets the circumstances stated in Section 4.9.1.

4.9.14. Who Can Request Suspension and Restoration

For Entity CAs that support suspension and restoration, those personnel authorized to request suspension and restoration of a certificate must be identified.

4.9.15. Procedure for Suspension and Restoration Requests

For Entity CAs that support suspension and restoration, all suspended certificate serial numbers must be populated on a full CRL within a timeframe specified in Section 4.9.7. The reason code CRL entry extension shall be populated with “certificateHold.” Restored
certificate serial numbers must not be present on the next full CRL published by the CA.

Practice Note: A certificate is considered restored only if its status at the time of CRL generation is neither suspended nor revoked.

For Entity CAs that support suspension, a request to suspend or restore a certificate must include:

- authentication of the requestor,
- identification of the certificate to be suspended or restored, and
- explanation of the reason for suspension or restoration.

If a CA or CMS product conducts certificate suspensions and restorations in an automated fashion (e.g., without a formal request outlined above), the circumstances or parameters associated with those automated suspensions and restorations must be documented in a CPS.

If a subscriber is requesting restoration of their suspended certificate, the identity of the subscriber must be re-established before restoring the certificate. The subscriber’s identity may be re-established using processes defined in Section 3.2.3.1, through the use of biometrics on file, or by the use of another private signature key of equivalent or greater assurance level issued to the subscriber.

The private key associated with any suspended certificate must not be used to authenticate the identity of the certificate subject.

### 5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auditable Event</th>
<th>Rudimentary</th>
<th>Basic</th>
<th>All Other Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CERTIFICATE REVOCATION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>All records related to certificate revocation request authorization, approval and execution, whether generated directly on the CA or generated by a related external system or process</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CERTIFICATE STATUS CHANGE APPROVAL</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
All records, including request, authorization, approval and execution related to certificate status changes (e.g., revocation, suspension, or restoration) whether generated directly on the CA or generated by a related external system or process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Events Archived</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data to Be Archived</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All records related to certificate status changes (e.g., revocation, suspension, or restoration) whether generated directly on the CA or generated as part of a related external system or process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.1. Types of Events Archived

6.1.1.4 PIV-I Content Signing Key Pair Generation

Cryptographic keying material used by CMSs, PIV-I issuing systems or devices for PIV-I Content Signing must be generated in [FIPS 140] validated cryptographic modules as specified in Section 6.2.1.

**Estimated Cost:** None

**Implementation Date:** Immediate upon publication

**Prerequisites for Adoption:** None

**Plan to Meet Prerequisites:** Not Applicable

**Approval and Coordination Dates:**
- Date presented to CPWG: 5/23/2023
- Date change released for comment: 9/8/2023
- Date comment adjudication published: 9/26/2023